Executive Summary
Over the past year, the macroeconomic and geopolitical landscape has shifted in ways that both validate and challenge the expectations set forth in our January 2025 white paper. During the second half of 2025, the reemergence of tariff policy as a primary driver of inflation became increasingly evident, with reciprocal tariffs and trade frictions leading to a marked acceleration in goods prices. Tariff pass-through appears to have contributed to persistent inflation, particularly in trade-exposed sectors, and weighed on real economic growth2 . Concurrently, immigration restrictions and mass deportations have constrained labor supply, resulting in a labor market characterized by fewer job openings, rising layoffs, and an uptick in the unemployment rate3 . These trends have reinforced the Federal Reserve’s cautious approach, with the central bank delivering three consecutive rate cuts in 2025 to support softer labor market conditions. The ten-year U.S. Treasury yield has held above four percent, reflecting investor concerns about government debt, geopolitical risk, and the durability of inflationary pressures4 . “With the number of conflicts at its highest since World War II, the world faces increased chaos and disorder.”5 – The Council on Foreign Relations
1 This White Paper provides Caro’s general market commentary and opinion and does not offer advisory services with regard to securities or investments in funds managed by Caro. The White Paper aims to inform current and prospective investors, including private fund investors of market and regulatory developments in the broader financial ecosystem.
2 Peterson Institute for International Economics, “The global economic effects of Trump’s 2025 tariffs”, June 2025; St. Louis Fed, “How Tariffs Are Affecting Prices in 2025”, October 2025; Oxford Economics, “Country Economic Forecast – U.S.”, November 2025.
3 SRR Consulting & Caro Investors, “Private Real Estate Credit: Opportunity Knocks”, January 2025; ADP NationalEmployment Report, November 2025; Challenger, Gray & Christmas, December 2025.
4 Federal Reserve, FOMC Statement and SEP, December 2025; Bloomberg, “US Yield Curve Is Steepest Since 2022 AfterFed’s Rate Cut Shift,” December 2025.
5 Council on Foreign Relations, “Five Takeaways From CFR’s 2026 Conflict Risk Assessment”, December 2025.
Since 2025, tensions rose, or active conflicts erupted in, to name a subset, Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, Sudan, Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Taiwan, Philippines, Japan, Cambodia, and Thailand. Shifting alliances (e.g., firming of North Korea / Russia alliance) have reflected changes in sovereign interests. U.S. tariff decisions have exacerbated tensions and cascading responses from trading partners and allies. Cumulatively, these shifting forces have underpinned an increase in capital markets volatility and the yield premia applicable to long-term borrowing costs6 . Against this backdrop, the private real estate credit market has continued to fill the funding gap created by more selective bank lending and the “maturity wall.” Industry estimates indicate that nearly $3 trillion in commercial and multifamily real estate mortgages are set to mature through 2029, with half of that total held by banks7 . This enduring need for refinancing and recapitalization has sustained demand for private credit solutions, particularly in transitional and value-add assets. The events of 2025 have largely validated our prior thesis: persistent long-term rate pressure, selective bank lending, and sector dispersion continue to shape the opportunity set for private real estate credit. The interplay of trade policy, labor supply constraints, and geopolitical risk introduces volatility that furthers demand for flexible capital solutions. This paper explores these themes, examining how capital markets, property fundamentals, and lender behavior have evolved in response to macroeconomic and policy shifts.
High for longer with less growth.
Elevated inflation to continue over the near term.
Core consumer price inflation (CPI) maintained a three-percent annualized trend through the first three quarters of 2025. The Fed’s preferred measure, growth in the core personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, trended at a 2.5% annual pace over the same period. Both measures accelerated into the second half of the year as tariffs began to increase goods prices, but fourth quarter inflation data is incomplete due to the government shutdown. CPI data collection was suspended for six weeks, resuming in mid-November, and leaving gaps in pricing data for all subcomponents except gasoline and new/used vehicles8 . Annual PCE inflation in September 2025 was revised to 2.8% in December with the post-shutdown release of third quarter gross domestic product and PCE inflation release dates for the remaining months of 2025 are not yet available9 .
6 Peterson Institute for International Economics, “The global economic effects of Trump’s 2025 tariffs”, June 2025.
7 Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), “Commercial/Multifamily Loan Maturity Volumes”, February 2025.
8 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), “Consumer Price Index – November 2025”, December 18, 2025.
9 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA): “Personal Income and Outlays, Data Update, September 2025,” December 23, 2025, and The BEA Blog (https://www.bea.gov/news/blog) as of January 5, 2026.
Exhibit 1: U.S. Core Inflation Trends
Source: SRR Consulting, BLS, Macrobond, data as of January 5, 2026.
Inflation will remain elevated as tariff pass-through continues. The trajectory is uncertain on two fronts. First, final tariff rates remain unknown. The Supreme Court could strike down the emergency declaration underpinning Trump’s reciprocal tariffs. If the court rules in his favor, the erratic adjustments to import taxes experienced in 2025 will likely continue. If not, other avenues10 exist for the executive branch to levy tariffs. Second, the pre-tariff import surge delays price increases as lower cost products are sold. The steady inflation trajectory in early 2025, followed by steeper goods price inflation in the second half of 2025 implies that tariff impacts are emerging. As lower cost inventories are depleted, prices will rise, even though the pace and duration are uncertain. The median Fed projection11 for inflation is above their two-percent target until 2028. Elevated prices today with continued above-trend inflation raises the risk of a hyperinflation cycle, where wages rise to meet living costs and business compensate with higher goods and service pricing.
Monetary and fiscal policy combine to steepen the yield curve.
The Fed cut the federal funds rate by 25 basis points at its December 2025 meeting. The benchmark rate is set at the 3.50%-3.75% range, or 175 basis points below its prior peak. After a nine-month pause, interest rate cuts resumed in September 2025 to support weaker labor market conditions.
10 Packard, Clark and Stan Veuger, Cato Institute, “Trump Has Many Options if the Supreme Court Strikes Down Tariffs,” December 5, 2025.
11 Federal Reserve Summary of Economic Projections, December 10, 2025.
Exhibit 2: Evolution of Federal Funds Rate Futures
Source: SRR Consulting, New York Fed, CME Group, Macrobond, data as of January 5, 2026.
Lower short-term interest rates reduce financing costs but are not sufficient to bring down long-term rates. The yield curve is steeper, with the ten-year U.S. Treasury yield holding above four percent, despite benchmark interest rate cuts. Longer-term rates are reacting to higher government debt, U.S. military actions in the Caribbean and South America, immigration restrictions and bans, and concerns over central bank independence. These issues raise concerns about long-term economic growth prospects and financial stability. Taking on excess government debt is warranted to support the economy during recessions and financial crises. However, the 2025 U.S. budget reconciliation bill, or OBBBA, was signed during a period of healthy output growth and elevated inflation. Tax changes in the budget will add over $4 trillion to the national debt and provide a short-term growth boost from tax cuts. This growth, however, is expected to fade into a drag on growth from higher inflation and interest rates12 .
Capital-intensive growth leaves labor behind.
In the first three quarters of 2025, U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) was volatile due to swings in imports, inventories, and private investment before and after Trump’s reciprocal
12 The Budget Lab at Yale, “Long-term Impacts of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, as Enacted on July 4, 2025,” July 30, 2025.
tariffs announcement. Real GDP contracted in the first quarter, then rebounded in the second and third quarters for 2.5% annualized growth from January through September 2025. The primary drivers of U.S. economic growth in 2025 are consumer spending and technology- driven business investment. Investment in artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, software, and data centers contributed 1.3% to GDP growth in the first three quarters of 2025, or half of the total. Excluding technology investment, private business investment has been in a contraction since the fourth quarter of 2024 and subtracted 0.4% from 2025 real GDP growth. Despite the dominant share of growth, tech investment is a small share of total GDP, at $1.9 trillion in the third quarter. This is up from $1.2 trillion in 2020, when the Bureau of Economic Analysis began tracking data center investment.
Exhibit 3: U.S. Real GDP Growth with Component Contributions
computers & peripheral equipment, software, IP research & development, and data centers. Source: SRR Consulting,
BEA, Macrobond, data as of January 5, 2026. The largest component of U.S. GDP is personal consumption expenditures, at $16.6 trillion in the third quarter, or 69% of the total. Given its size, the direction of consumer spending has a significant impact on total output growth. Consumer spending contributed 1.5% to total growth during the first three quarters of 2025. At less than two percent, consumer spending growth was below-trend for the three-quarter period but had a strong showing in the third quarter with a 2.4% contribution, or 55% of the 4.3% quarterly annualized output growth from July to September 2025.
Elevated inflation is stacking tariff-driven price increases on top of imbedded price hikes from earlier in the decade and the impact on consumer spending is bifurcated into a K-shaped pattern. Higher income and wealthy households can stock up in anticipation of tariffs and even boost spending due to equity and housing market wealth effects. Meanwhile, middle- to low- income consumers are increasingly burdened by high prices. Real median earnings for all wage and salary workers are up 1.3% for the year ending in the third quarter of 2025, and 1.0% per annum over the last decade13 . While this implies that earnings are rising above inflation, the level of median earnings remains low, at an inflation-adjusted $19,500 per year, or $63,200 per year in 2025 dollars. Wage growth for low-income earners has been supported by increases in state and city-level minimum wages. The federal minimum wage, at $7.25 per hour, has not changed since 2009, while the average minimum wage across all states and the District of Columbia averages $11.14 per hour in the third quarter 2025, or $23,200 per year for full-time work14 . For comparison, the top decile of college degree holders have the highest median earnings at $200,800 per year, nearly 9x more than the average U.S. minimum wage earner. Consumers also face bifurcated income impacts from the OBBBA. Higher-income households will see tax relief in 2026, supporting continued spending growth, and perhaps boosting the housing market in early 2026. Meanwhile, lower-income households face reduced transfer payments and healthcare subsidies, reducing their disposable income. Low- and middle- income households may face trade-offs and/or increase their use of credit cards to manage higher costs. Against this backdrop, the labor market is weakening. The low-hire, low-fire labor market that characterized much of 2025 is shifting toward a low-hire trajectory with layoffs rising and job openings edging down. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. payroll employment expanded by 570,000 jobs during the first eleven months of 2025, for 0.4% growth year-to-date. Job gains downshifted over the year with monthly job gains in the first quarter averaging 111,000 per month, then fading to a three-month average of 22,300 job gains per month as of November 202515 . Meanwhile, 1.2 million layoffs16 occurred from January through November 2025, the highest total since 2020, making 2025 the sixth year since 1993 with over one million layoffs. Labor supply is down due to immigration restrictions and mass deportations. The combined effects of low labor supply and demand has kept the unemployment rate relatively stable. The headline unemployment rate stood at 4.6% as of November 2025, up 40 basis points from one
13 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Usual Median Weekly Earnings, Full-Time Wage & Salary Workers, data as of December 4, 2025.
14 U.S. Department of Labor, Wages & Salaries, Minimum Wage, data as of January 5, 2026.
15 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “The Employment Situation – November 2025,” December 16, 2025.
16 Challenger, Gray & Christmas Inc., “Challenger Report: 71,321 Job Cuts on Restructurings, Closings, Economy,” December 4, 2025.
year ago. Limited movement in the unemployment rate has kept the Real-Time Sahm Rule Recession Indicator at bay in 2025. This key recession indicator briefly rose above the 0.5 trigger in 2024 and bears watching in 2026 after rising to 0.4 in November 2025. Layoffs and less hiring imply growing slack in the labor market, and this is revealed in a broader measure of unemployment as well as fewer job openings.
Exhibit 4: Approaching Recession Trigger with Increased Labor Market Slack
Source: SRR Consulting, St. Louis Fed (Sahm Rule), BLS, Macrobond, data as of January 5, 2026.
The headline unemployment rate, or U-3, counts unemployed persons looking for work, while the U-617 measure addresses total labor underutilization by including unemployed persons not counted in the labor force and part-time employees still searching for full-time employment. The U-6 unemployment rate increased to 8.7% in November 2025, up from 7.7% a year ago and 7.0% in November 2023. In combination with job openings, the count of U-6 unemployed persons reflects 1.9 people looking for full-time employment per job available18 . The U.S. economy is in a capital-intensive expansion driven by an AI investment boom. Payroll employment growth will likely be muted while AI investment generates efficiencies that support productivity growth. Stimulative fiscal policy, meanwhile, should boost economic growth in the short term, facilitating technology investment and spending by higher-income households. However, the fiscal stimulus is expected to fade and become a drag on growth by adding inflationary pressure that restrictive monetary policy would need to tame. The potential for a politicized Fed to cut rates too aggressively is a key risk ahead in 2026. This could fuel additional inflation, further weakening spending and increasing unemployment.
17 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Concepts and Definitions, Alternative measures of labor underutilization.
18 SRR Consulting estimates U-6 unemployed persons per job opening in November 2025 with the November 2025 U-6 unemployment rate and October 2025 job openings due to the delayed BLS Job Openings and Labor Turnover survey data for November 2025.
Investors seek yield amid high rates and costs.
Lower property prices spur transactions despite limited risk premia.
Commercial real estate sales volume has improved considerably in 2025 as repricing brought more investors to the table. Transaction volume was depressed as interest rates rose but annual volume through the third quarter of 2025 is at its highest level since mid-202319 . Broad market pricing, as reported by Green Street Advisors20 , show aggregate property prices as of November 2025 down 15.9% from their March 2022 peak. The 2022 peak marked 29.1% price growth from the pandemic low in May 2020. The price recovery from the initial pandemic shock was largely driven by logistics and multifamily, but all property types were vulnerable to the post-pandemic interest-rate-driven repricing. The revival of transaction activity allowed prices to bottom in September 2024, and rise a cumulative 3.9% through November 2025.
Exhibit 5: Property Prices Remain Below Pre-Pandemic and 2022 Peak Levels
Source: SRR Consulting, Green Street Advisors, Macrobond, data as of December 8, 2025.
The price correction has supported liquidity, but private real estate values remain elevated relative to other asset classes. The National Council for Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) publishes aggregate performance and operations data on private commercial properties managed by their members. Appraisal lag can be a factor in interpreting this data, so Figure 6 below only includes cap rates for properties bought or sold each quarter.
19 MSCI, “Capital Trends: US Big Picture,” Q3 2025.
20 Green Street Commercial Property Price Index, data as of December 4, 2025.
Exhibit 6: Transaction Cap Rates at Narrow Spread to 10-Year U.S. Treasury Yield
Source: SRR Consulting, NCREIF, Federal Reserve, Macrobond, data as of 3Q 2025.
The average NCREIF transaction cap rate was 5.6% in the third quarter of 2025, up from 5.4% a year ago, but down from a post-pandemic peak of 6.2% in the first quarter of 2024. The sharp rise in interest rates to fight inflation narrowed the spread between cap rates and the ten-year U.S. Treasury yield with limited upward movement in cap rates. Property income continues to be supported by post-pandemic lease roll-up to higher rents. However, when combined with lower market prices, private real estate cap rates should be rising. Sticky valuations, particularly for core properties, are reducing the spread instead. To understand these dynamics, it is critical to examine conditions by property type.
Real estate values and pricing vary wildly by property type.
Logistics21 remains the darling of commercial real estate appreciation. Logistics space demand, and appreciation, soared during the pandemic because of a spike in the e- commerce share of retail sales, which was followed by a supply boom to accommodate the expansion. Capital values underwent a modest interest rate-driven correction through mid- 2024 but values stabilized at an elevated level in 2025.
21 The SRR Consulting logistics sector includes the NCREIF industrial warehouse and specialized storage/logistics subtypes.
Institutionally managed multifamily properties tend to house mid- to high-income renters, who face constraints to becoming first-time homebuyers from high mortgage rates and home prices. Multifamily values experienced a post-pandemic lift but have flattened since 2023. Higher interest rates were the first limiting factor for appreciation, then increased supply, particularly in the Sunbelt, kept aggregate multifamily values flat through 2025. Capital values for strip retail and CBD/urban office22 , however, have not recovered to pre- pandemic levels. As a result, these two sectors are the only major property types with positive spreads to the risk-free rate. The relative yield available in office and strip retail is attractive versus other property types due to the pronounced value correction in these sectors. However, income growth prospects for these two property types vary considerably, with retail more likely to outperform. Vacant shopping center space is scarce due to limited construction and the desirability of open-air space among expanding retailers. CBD/urban office values will likely find a bottom as tenants trade up to space that best fits their needs and underutilized offices are repurposed for other uses, but this will take years, similar to the e-commerce correction in retail demand. Like their representation in GDP, data centers are a small but rapidly growing subset of NCREIF holdings. The property type entered the NCREIF database in 2019 with 37.8% capital value growth through the third quarter of 2025. Institutional exposure to the property type now exceeds the market value of student housing.
22 The SRR Consulting CBD/office sector, also referred to as primary office, includes the NCREIF CBD and urban office subtypes.
Exhibit 7: Wide Dispersion in Capital Values by Property Type
Source: SRR Consulting, NCREIF, data as of 3Q 2025.
Logistics properties held by NCREIF members have been valued at a negative spread to the ten-year U.S. Treasury yield since 2022 and the data center valuation cap rate spread is deeply negative, at minus 195 basis points relative to the ten-year U.S. Treasury yield. The multifamily appraisal-based cap rate has maintained a thin, but positive spread to the risk-free rate during the same period, while strip retail and office properties have held a spread of roughly 150 basis points over the ten-year Treasury.
Exhibit 8: Negative Spreads Persist in High-Demand Property Types
Source: SRR Consulting, NCREIF, Federal Reserve, data as of 3Q 2025.
In the near term, diminished development will support valuations across property types. Construction is largely sidelined by trade and immigration policy, which have increased materials costs and restricted labor availability. Economic conditions, however, pose new headwinds to tenant demand and rent growth in major property types.
Private RE credit fills the lending gap with desired yield.
Bank CRE lending standards tight despite demand growth.
With $1.8 trillion in assets, banks remain the largest holder of commercial and multifamily debt, accounting for 37.5% of the nearly $5 trillion outstanding.
Figure 9: Share of $4.9 trillion CRE Debt Outstanding by Lender Type
Source: SRR Consulting, MBA, Macrobond, data as of 2Q 2025.
Bank exposure to CRE increased by $31.2 billion over the year ending in the second quarter of 2025, which is well below the five-year average increase in bank lending to CRE. Since the second quarter of 2020, banks added an average of $74.3 billion in commercial and multifamily loans to their balance sheet each year. Improved liquidity over the past year was supported by banks, but led by agency/GSEs, CMBS, and insurance companies. The pullback in bank CRE lending aligns with continued tightening of standards, even as CRE loan demand increases. In aggregate, domestic banks have been tightening lending standards since 2022. The net share of banks tightening standards dropped to the single digits at year-end 2025, with tighter conditions most prevalent for construction and development loans. For U.S. borrowers, foreign-chartered banks offer an alternative with lending standards loosening in the second half of 2025.
Figure 10: Share of Banks Tightening U.S. Commercial and Multifamily Loan Standards
Source: SRR Consulting, Federal Reserve, Macrobond, data as of December 8, 2025.
The composition of CRE lending activity has shifted enough to reduce banks’ share by 130 basis points since 2020. Agency/GSEs, CMBS, and insurance companies had small increases in their already sizeable market share for real estate lending, while pension funds and finance companies saw small declines in their small shares over the past five years. The nonfinancial corporate business share of real estate lending gained nearly two percentage points over this period. Real estate debt held by these non-financial firms ranged from $10-to- $25 billion until 2023, when lending jumped above $100 billion. High interest rates may play a role in the shift, although lending to build data centers for corporate AI infrastructure is a more likely culprit. MSCI reports23 that private credit is expanding as a financing source for AI companies to manage hyperscale developments.
23 MSCI, “Investment Trends in Focus: Key Themes for 2026,” December 11, 2025.
Exhibit 11: Annual CRE Mortgage Maturities by Lender Type
Source: SRR Consulting, MBA, Trepp, data as of February 21, 2025.
Nearly $3 trillion in commercial and multifamily real estate mortgages are set to mature through 2029 and 50% of the total is held by banks24 . The distribution of maturities are weighted heavily to 2025 as loans set to mature in 2023 and 2024 were extended into 2025. Extensions may continue to play a role in pushing debt maturities forward, although lower short-term interest rates could slow the use of ‘extend and pretend’ next year.
Favorable risk-return profile supports allocation to private RE credit.
Private real estate credit offers higher yields compared to other real estate exposures. Private direct or indirect real estate equity investment offers the lowest relative returns among CRE asset classes, and public real estate offers the highest volatility. All three real estate exposures have lower trailing returns and higher volatility than private real estate credit.
24 MBA, “2024 Commercial/Multifamily Loan Maturities,” February 21, 2025.
Exhibit 12: Risk-Return Characteristics by Asset Class, 2007 - 2024
Source: SRR Consulting, Cliffwater (Private Credit), NCREIF (Private RE Equity, Core PERE Funds), NAREIT (Public Real
Estate), Moody's retrieved from FRED, data through 4Q 2024. Demand for private real estate credit is likely to continue increasing as banks tend to $1.5 trillion in debt maturities through 2029. New bank lending will likely drift toward existing borrowers as well as high-quality and/or large-scale assets. The lending gap is still with us; however, private real estate credit also has a cyclical role to play. The macroeconomic environment poses some downside risk to real estate demand, while limited construction offers upside risk to property values. Rising costs may be beneficial to holding supply at bay, but inflation can be a drag on net operating income at the property level. As a result, property operating performance will likely differentiate winners and losers, driving owners to raise capital to maintain and/or improve their assets. Shorter term and flexible lending options from private credit funds can meet this need.
About Caro Investors
Caro Investors is an SEC-registered, institutional investment management firm headquartered in Maryland, founded in 2024 by Careina Williams. Caro Investors goal is to fill a growing void of institutional investment management firms addressing middle-market investment opportunities in real estate equity and credit. The Caro investment team has deep origination and investment experience across capital structures, property types, geographic regions, market cycles, and risk criteria.25 Caro believes it is differentiated by its institutional expertise, risk mitigation focus, and research driven orientation. Caro’s greatest priority is its fiduciary responsibility of securing the future for our investors, hence supporting their underlying constituents, including government workers, teachers, firemen, colleges, and foundations. The Firm's inaugural private credit strategy is focused on lower middle-market debt investments backed by commercial real estate in sectors such as multifamily, industrial, and essential retail, which Caro believes offers resilience. Caro Investors structures custom capital solutions for experienced real estate sponsors. The Firm’s unlevered credit strategy relies upon a rigorous fundamental approach to underwriting the underlying real estate collateral. Given the current capital markets dislocation, we believe the next few years may present differentiated opportunities to earn enhanced returns in credit.
About SRR Consulting
Founded in 2018, SRR Consulting is a research firm serving the commercial real estate industry. SRR Consulting offers clients custom reports and independent insights into investment strategy, macroeconomic conditions, and real estate market outlooks across commercial property types and investment styles. Sara R. Rutledge, CRE® is the founder and chief economist of SRR Consulting. She began her real estate research career in 1999 and has broad industry experience working with data providers, brokerage firms, and investors to create and monetize research-oriented applications and products. Ms. Rutledge was previously the head of global market research for StepStone Group, leading the global macroeconomic and private equity real estate performance outlook. She has also served as the managing director of real estate products for a data science start-up, director of research at the National Council for Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries, and a regional director of research at CBRE. She also spent eight years on Invesco Real Estate’s research team, leading US property market forecasts and global macroeconomic views. Ms. Rutledge has published real estate performance research in Business Economics and co- authored a Real Estate Research Institute-funded paper. She is a Counselor of Real Estate® and an actively involved member of the National Association for Business Economics and Urban Land Institute.
25 Investment personnel at Caro Investors have over 60 years of combined investment experience.
IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES AND NOTES
Certain economic and market information contained herein has been obtained from published sources prepared by other parties, which in certain cases has not been updated through the date of the distribution of this letter. While such sources are believed to be reliable for the purposes used herein, Caro does not assume any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of such information. Further, no third party has assumed responsibility for independently verifying the information contained herein and accordingly no such persons make any representations with respect to the accuracy, completeness or reasonableness of the information provided herein. Unless otherwise indicated, market analysis and conclusions are based upon opinions or assumptions that Caro considers to be reasonable.
We do not represent that the information contained herein is accurate or complete, and it should not be relied upon as such. Opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notice.
The information contained herein should be treated with strict confidentiality and may not be disclosed by the recipient or delivered to any person, except to the recipient’s advisers or with Caro’s consent.
The contents of this document may contain forwardlooking statements that are based on management’s beliefs, assumptions, current expectations, estimates, and projections about the financial industry, the economy, and real estate related investments. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict with regard to timing, extent, likelihood and degree of occurrence. Therefore, actual results and outcomes may materially differ from what may be expressed or forecasted in such forwardlooking statements.
